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STATUS OF ARMED FORCES ABROAD
Wilfred A. Hearn
The United States long ago recognized the fact that the only true
security in the world today is collective security. In furtherance of this
concept, the United States has entered
into many alliances with other nations
of the free world in order to protect
itself as well as assist in the protection
of these friendly countries. One such
alliance is the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. And, as a part of our
contribution to this partnership, we
have stationed a sizable number of our
military forces in Europe. In other
friendly countries throughout the world
our armed forces are assigned in more
limited numbers. This is the first time in
history that in time of peace military
forces of the United States have been
assigned to foreign areas for an indefinite period of time.
The understanding with each country
in which our forces are stationed includes specific arrangements with respect to jurisdiction over these forces.
All told, there are approximately 60
countries with which the United States
has some type of jurisdictional arrangement regarding American servicemen
stationed within their borders.
It is my purpose to consider the
provision of these agreements which
relates to the authority of the host state
and the military authorities of the sending state to exercise jurisdiction over
offenses committed by members of the

visiting force within the territory of the
host state. This phase of the relationship
between our forces and the host state is
the most controversial. It has received
the greatest amount of publicity and is
of prime interest to commanding officers.
Before considering the division of
jurisdictional authority established by
these agreements, however, it may be
helpful first to see what would be the
status of our service personnel abroad in
the absence of any agreements.
A sovereign nation exercises absolute
and exclusive jurisdiction within its own
territory. If the commander of a visiting
friendly military force convenes a courtmartial to try a subordinate for some
purely military offense, such as failure
to obey the lawful order of a superior
officer, the commander impinges upon
the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign.
Yet, the maintenance of discipline
within a military force is recognized as
the inherent responsibility and duty of
the commander. In order to overcome
this impasse, and at the same time
preserve the integrity of both of these
principles, International Law recognized
the further proposition that where a
sovereign permits a friendly foreign military force to enter his territory, he
implicitly waives jurisdiction over the
force with respect to matters of military
discipline. This implied immunity is
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strictly construed and extends only to
the right to discipline and punish as may
be required for the government of the
force. Whatever may be their acceptance
in many law texts, however, the hard
fact of today's international situation is
that such broader exceptions are not
accepted in our world of rising nationalistic feelings.
This state of the law may come as a
surprise to some who recall that during
World War II we exercised exclusive
jurisdiction over our armed forces
wherever they were situated. In point of
fact, we exercised exclusive jurisdiction
during the war years solely as the result
of wartime agreements that reflected
wartime requirements and the relative
circumstances of the parties at the time
of negotiation.
Most of the agreements in force
today were negotiated in time of peace
to meet peacetime requirements. They
vary all the way from granting exclusive
jurisdiction to the United States in a
few instances, such as in Korea, Greenland, and Ethiopia, to the establishment
of a system of concurrent jurisdiction,
such as in Bermuda, the Bahamas, and
the NATO countries. In general, the
type of jurisdiction which is granted to
the United States is largely dependent
upon the mission of the force assigned,
its size, the laws of the host country and
the willingness of the host country to
waive its jurisdiction in favor of the
United States. There are no agreements
by which a foreign state exercises exclusive jurisdiction over our forces.
Under the circumstances, it would be
error to say that in completing these
jurisdictional arrangements the United
States Government has surrendered any
rights of the American serviceman who
is stationed abroad. On the other hand,
it can be said that every agreement
which has been negotiated amounts to a
specific gain for our service personnel
abroad.
In many countries there may be
more than one category of our forces,

each categGry being present by virtue of
a different agreement and, therefore,
each being in a different jurisdictional
status.
Under the mutual defense assistance
agreements, the personnel assigned to
the MAAG units enjoy the same immunity as embassy personnel of corresponding rank.
The agreements that establish the
various military and naval missions provide that personnel aflsigned to this duty
will remain subject to United States
military law and only in some instances
subject to local jurisdiction.
Personnel serving in the Ryukyus are
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, due to the fact that we
exercise control over the area.
Most of our forces stationed abroad
are a part of the, NATO Defensive
Organization and are serving in the
various countries which are members of
the NATO alliance. The status of these
forces is controlled by the Status of
Forces Agreement, a multilateral convention entered into by all of the
signatories of the NATO alliance with
the exception of Iceland, which does
not maintain an armed force of its own.
This agreement was negotiated in 1951,
and ratified by the Senate of the United
States in 1953. It is by far the most
important convention relating to the
status of our forces abroad.
This convention superseded many
bilateral agreements which had previously controlled the status of forces
among the NATO countries. It establishes uniformity in relations between
the member of a force, the civilian
components, and their dependents, with
the authorities of the receiving state,
and it clarifies and broadens the right of
the sending state to exercise jurisdiction
over its own forces.
The major concept of this arrangement is the establishment of concurrent
jurisdiction with a scheme designed to
divide the exercise of jurisdiction between the authorities of the sending
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state and the host state, based upon the
principle of primary interest.
The military authorities of the
sending state are given the primary right
to exercise jurisdiction over a member
of a force or civilian component when
the offense involves the property of the
sending state or the person or property
of a member of the force, a civilian
component of the sending state or a
dependent, or the offense arises out of
the performance of official duties. In all
other cases the receiving state has primary jurisdiction.
It may be appropriate at this point to
invite your attention to the status of
dependents under this jurisdictional
arrangement. While the Uniform Code
of Military Justice places dependents
within the category of persons who are
subject to military law when accompanying our forces abroad and the
status of forces agreement gives to the
military authorities of the sending state
the authority to exercise all criminal
and disciplinary jurisdiction authorized
by the laws of their own state, the
agreement reserves to the host state
primary jurisdiction over offenses committed by dependents.
One of the important features of the
status of forces arrangement is the
official duty determination, which controls in a great many cases whether the
military commander or the authorities
of the host state shall have primary
jurisdiction. Two aspects of this provision are worthy of note: namely, what
is to be the definition of official duty,
and who will make the decision. The
agreement answers neither question,
although it would appear from the
working papers of those who drafted
the agreement that it was intended that
the military authorities of the sending
state make the decision. This is the
position urged by the United States,
although it has not been accepted by all
of the signatories. For instance, in the
United Kingdom, British Courts make
the final decision in official duty

questions. Substantially the same practices are followed in Japan and Turkey.
In all other NATO countries, however,
the determination of the official duty
question by the authorities of the
visiting force appears to be final.
You may be interested in a recent
development in Turkey. The Turkish
courts have been construing the phrase
"In performance of official duty" far
stricter than United States authorities,
with the result that Turkey was prosecuting cases which our military commanders considered to be official duty
cases. The difficulty was found to lie in
the fact that in translating this phrase
into Turkish it acquired a more limited
meaning. As a solution, Turkey enacted
a law authorizing an interpretation
which would include an offense committed ''In connection with the performance of official duty." One of the
immediate results of this change was the
release to the Army for trial by courtmartial of a sergeant, who was being
held for trial for a traffic death which
occurred while he was driving a government vehicle on temporary duty.
Another important feature of the
agreement provides that the state having
the primary right to exercise jurisdiction
shall give sympathetic consideration to
a request from the authorities of the
other state that jurisdiction be waived in
its favor. It is the policy of the United
States to request a waiver in every case
in which it does not have primary
jurisdiction. Also, it is the policy of the
United States not to waive jurisdiction
in any case in which it has primary
jurisdiction. Our military authorities
have been successful in securing a waiver
by the host state of primary right in a
great number of cases. It may be said
that in most instances the host state is
willing to waive its right except where
the offense is one which arouses public
indignation or grossly offends morals or
national pride.
In a supplemental exchange of notes
with the Netherlands, that state agreed
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to waive primary jurisdiction except
where it is determined that an offense is
of particular importance to the Netherlands authorities. Under this arrangement, we are given the right to act in
substantially all cases involving persons
subject to military law. This is known as
the "Netherlands Formula," and has
been adopted with respect to our forces
in other countries.
The right to request a waiver is
particularly important in the case of
dependents. As noted earlier, the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over
dependents rests with the host state.
Thus, a dependent is in somewhat the
same status as a tourist, and upon the
commission of an offense will be tried
by the courts of the receiving state
unless jurisdiction is waived. It might be
added in passing that service personnel
and members of civilian components are
also in the status of tourists when in a
leave status in a country other than the
one in which they are stationed unless
there is some special understanding with
that country.
Whether a case involves the question
of official duty or the waiver of primary
jurisdiction by the host state, the
administrative steps required to protect
the interests of the accused must be
promptly and effectively pursued, beginning with the immediate commanding officer and extending all the
way to the highest authority who deals
with the foreign office on the government level. Our experience in gaining
the right to try such a large number of
cases in which the receiving states have
had the primary right is due to effective
administration at all levels and the
general feeling of mutual respect and
fair dealing that typifies the relations
between our forces and the officials of
the host countries. I do not believe that
the importance of maintaining such
amiable relationship can be overemphasized.
Without attempting to burden you
with statistics, let me indicate the

degree of success we are having by
giving you a few figures just received
from Japan. For the six months' period
ending 1 June 1956, there were 2,675
offenses committed by United States
personnel subject to Japanese jurisdiction. A waiver was received in 2,610
cases-of the remaining, 44 have been
tried-16 were sentenced to confinement, but only 4 were sentenced to
confinement unsuspended.
The NATO countries have agreed
that the authorities of both the sending
and the receiving states shall assist each
other in arresting members of a force,
civilian component or dependents in the
territory of the receiving state, and in
handing them over to the authority
which is to exercise jurisdiction.
This provision is of particular interest
to the Navy, since a ship when in a port
of a foreign country physically is within
the territory of that country, notwithstanding the fiction of extraterritoriality
which is traditionally applied to menof-war when visiting foreign ports.
Normally, treaty provisions prevail over
general principles of International Law,
and we find this rule to apply in this
case.
Thus, where a naval ship is in the
port of a NATO country and a member
of the crew is charged by local authorities with the commission of an offense
over which they have the right to
exercise primary jurisdiction, the commanding officer, upon the request of
local authorities, may be required by
the agreement to deliver up the accused.
In other words, such a case would be
handled in the same fashion as though
the accused were based ashore.
In contrast with the requirement in
NATO ports, let us consider the status
of a crew member of a vessel of war in
the port of a country not a member of
NATO. In accordance with the exterritorial status of the ship a member
of the crew when he returns to his ship
becomes immune from arrest by local
authorities so long as he remains on
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hoard; and his commanding officer is
not authorized to alter this status. If the
foreign authorities desire custody of
such a crew memher, they must proceed
through diplomatic channels.
Now let us consider an actual case
involving this question.
Within the past year a destroyer
made a recreational visit to an island
helonging to a friendly power. There
was no agreement hetween the United
States and this power relative to the
surrender of personnel and there was
concurrent jurisdiction over any offenses committed ashore hy memhers of
the cre~v. John Doe, a memher of the
destroyer's crew, was alleged to have
assaulted one of the local uniformed
customs officials. The next day, amid
considerahle confusion and local pressures hrought ahout hy an acute local
political situation, the commanding officer turned John Doe over to the local
authorities with the understanding that
it was solely for the purposes of identification and questioning and that Doe
would he returned to his ship on completion of the interview. But Doe ended
up hehind the hars of the local jail, the
local officillls refused to surrender
custody, and the ship was required to
sail leaving Doe hehind. There were no
United States military activities in the
island.
Three weeks later, after some two
dozen messages, the employment of two
local attorneys, the return to the island
of two officers and seven enlisted men
from the ship on TAD to testify for the
defense, two trials, a six-month sentence
to confinement, which was reduced to a
$126 fine, and the expenditure of some
$1,200 in Doe's defense, which was
raised from among the American residents in the island, the fine was paid
and John Doe was returned to the
United States hy commercial air at
government expense. Suhsequently, the
Navy Department reimhursed all who
had contrihuted to the defense fund.
And now for the final chapter of this

story. According to the investigation
conducted hy the ship, it was actually a
case of mistakt;n identity.
In view of the importance of this
jurisdictional question and the many
different situations that may he encountered due to differing treaty provisions in some instances, and the absence
of treaty arrangements in others, with
the risk of being a hit repetitious, let me
quickly restate the general guidelines on
this point.
In countries where we do have a
treaty or agreement pertaining to
criminal jurisdiction over personnel of
the naval forces, such as a status of
forces agreement, an ohligation may
exist which will require a commanding
officer to turn.a suspected serviceman
over to local authorities for possible
prosecution in the foreign courts.
In countries where we do not have
treaties or agreements regarding the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
personnel in our naval forces, the
general rule of International Law
applies. That law specifies that where
personnel are ashore for liberty or recreation they come under the jurisdiction
of the foreign country, and they can
therefore he tried in local courts. However, such jurisdiction can only he exercised when the foreign country also has
custody or physical control over the
suspected person.
Where we do not have treaty commitments and an offense has been committed within the foreign territory hut
the suspect has returned to his ship, the
situation is different. In this case, if the
foreign state desires to exercise its jurisdiction it must press its claim for
delivery of the suspect through diplomatic channels.
The status of forces agreement has
heen criticized in some quarters for
allegedly doing away with the constitutional protection which our service personnel have in this country. Such an
approach seems to he in step with the
proposition that the constitution
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follows the flag-a view no longer considered tenable. As a matter of fact, this
agreement introduced for the first time
provisions wherehy the receiving state
undertook to guarantee certain specific
rights to members of the visiting forces
accused of an offense before a foreign
court. These guaranteed rights are: The
right to a prompt and speedy trial; the
right to he informed in advance of trial
of the specific charges against him; the
right to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses; the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against
him; the right to have legal representation of his own choice, and the services
of an interpreter; and the right to
communicate with a representative of
his own government.
Steps have he en taken to insure that
these rights are made available to service
personnel. The resolution of the Senate
of the United States, in ratifying the
status of forces agreement, imposed
upon the armed services specific responsibilities aimed at insuring fully to each
serviceman subject to foreign trial all of
the rights guaranteed him by the agreement.
It is required that a "designated"
commanding officer be appointed for
each country where a force is stationed,
whose duty it is to supervise the operation of this jurisdictional arrangement
wihin his area; to complete a study of
local criminal law and procedure; and,
when a serviceman is an accused hefore
a foreign court, to request through
diplomatic channels a waiver of jurisdiction or release from custody in any case
where it is considered that he will not
receive a fair trial, or fair treatment
before or after trial.
He must designate an observer to
attend the trial of each accused. This
observer must be a lawyer in all but
minor cases, and he must submit a
written report to the designated commanding officer and the Judge Advocate
General of the accused's service.
Legislation passed at the last session

of Congress authorized the military departments to employ counsel, pay counsel fees, court costs, and to furnish bail
in any case where a person subject to
military law is an accused before a
foreign court.
Resolving questions relating to the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction is not
all that is involved in the relationship
between service personnel and the host
state. The very presence of a visiting
force in a foreign state, in many cases
with accompanying dependents and for
indefinite periods, has an impact upon
the economic, social and cultural pattern of the local population. The result
is somewhat the same as that experienced in communities within the
United States when military or naval
activities are established within their
midst for the first time.
The status of forces agreement has
undertaken to meet these circumstances
by providing the members of the ~isiting
force with immunity from local laws,
taxation and customs regulations in
keeping with their temporary status,
and by imposing upon the members of
the force a civil responsibility in keeping
with the needs of the local community.
A great number of the nonmilitary
offenses committed hy our personnel
abroad involve incidents in which personal injury or property damage is
sustained by third persons. A speedy
and fair settlement of claims growing
out of such incidents gives great assistance to our efforts to obtain a waiver
of jurisdiction by the host state. All too
often the determination of the local
authorities to exercise their jurisdiction
may be traced to the pressure brought
to hear on hehalf of an injured claimant,
who is unhappy over an apparent delay
in making restitution for the wrong he
has suffered. Such a claim may be one
for which the sending state has a legal
responsibility, as when the injury was
caused by a member of the force while
in the performance of an official duty.
Or, the claim may be one for which
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there is no legal responsibility and
which is considered and settled gratuitously by the sending state. Claims of
the first category are investigated and
paid ~y the host state on the basis of
the law of the host state. The cost of
such settlement is borne 75 per cent by
the sending state and 25 per cent by the
host state. In the latter category of
claims the host state investigates and
evaluates the claim and then informs the
sending state of the amount it considers
appropriate should the sending state
desire to make an ex gratia settlement.
It is true that from the military or
naval Commander's point of view the
ideal jurisdictional arrangement would
be to have complete and exclusive jurisdiction over all personnel attached to
and accompanying his command overseas. From a practical point of view,
however, this is impossible. We have
seen that International Law gives no
such right to a military commander in
the absence of an agreement to that
effect with the host nation. We are
therefore required to rely upon concessions obtained by agreements with the
nations where our forces are stationed
or may otherwise be present.
The NATO Status of Forces Agreement is the key agreement in this
respect. Its terms were agreed to only
after lengthy and careful negotiation,
and represent the maximum concessions
in jurisdiction that NATO receiving
states were willing to surrender to sending states in a multilateral treaty. Its

proVIsIons govern the status of larger
members of our military personnel more
than any other single agreement, and its
terms have been stated to represent the
minimum jurisdictional standards which
are acceptable to the Congress and
Department of Defense. The problem
has not been laid to rest, however, for
our military and diplomatic officials
consistently have sought wherever possible, by additional bilateral agreements
and by informal working arrangements,
to obtain even greater jurisdictional
concessions.
As a result of these arrangements, the
jurisdiction exercised in actual practice
by United States military authorities is
in excess of that to be found in the
basic NATO SOF Formula in practically
every country in which we have forces
assigned. In reporting to the Senate on
the experience of our armed forces
under the Status of Forces Agreement,
Senator Ervin stated that the jurisdiction arrangements regarding our forces
abroad have not adversely affected
morale and discipline of our personnel
nor have they interfered with the
accomplishment of our military missions in those. c_ountries. This success
may be credited to the recogniton by
the authorities of the United States and
the host nations of a mutual responsibility in this undertaking and to our
interest in the military man as an
individual and our dedication to the
protection and preservation of his rights
to the best of our ability.
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